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Some Reflections on Existence 
by 
Hector-Neri Castaneda 
' : ·  
0. This is a preliminary to a draft of a future paper' which will be a third 
introduction to my ''Thinking and the �tructure of the World," Philosophia, 4 
(1974): 3-40.1 This preliminary is written for discussion at the meeting of the Onto­
logy Discussion Group in connection with the 1975 Western Division Meeti�gs of 
the American Philosophical Association. It consists of two parts. In Part I there is a 
schedule of some puzzles about existence: they are t�e data to be taken into ac­
count by the theory of existence and individuals outlined in Part II . 
Part I 
1. The concept of existence is one of the most fundamental concepts. Its 
fundamentality is exhibited by the many perplexities that reflection on existence 
produces. Here I will discuss some of them briefly, mostly as a reminder, so to 
speak, and in order to have something concrete to motivate the account to be 
developed. By existence I "1ean here existence of ordinary particulars, whether 
physical or mental. Usually the discussions of existence deal with the problem of the 
reality (or existence, if you wish) of universals or other abstract entities, or within 
the ontological status of fictional entities. My topic is exclusively the reality o� 
concrete particulars, those which typically come to be and cease to exist, the .ordin­
ary ones a5 above mentioned. For all we care in this paper we can say that universJis 
and abstract particulars exist, but ft will be convenient to say here that they subsist, 
so that our use of 'existence ' is less confusing. On the other hand, fictional entities 
are not entirely out of our present purview. There are abstract fictional individuals, 
if individuals they are, like the second even number between 7 and 9 and the third 
prime number greater than 4 that is also even. But we will not be concerned with 
them. Nor will we be concerned with fictional abstract individuals, again if such 
they are, like the 1800 Volkswagen with automatic transmission. But there are con­
crete individuals that are also fictional like the second wife of Jesus of Nazareth and 
the third son of Napoleon I, who was also a King of Rome. There are concrete 
fictional tigers, a5 we shall see. I hope that these brief remarks will suffice to provide 
at least a partial demarcation of the subject matter of this discussion. (l wish there 
were time to engage in a protracted Moorean characterization of some paradigm 
examples for discussion.) 
2. Our subject is existence, the reality of concrete individuals. But our topic 
is only the nature or st�ucture of existence. Our goal is to characterize existence in 
contrast to ev1erything else by providing some of its basic laws. Since every law 
presupposes a
.
n internal structure of the er:itities the law is about, the laws of exis­
tence require that we investigate the basic structure of existence and of the propo­
sitions or states of affairs in which existence is involved. A clue to this comes from 
the many puzzles about existence. 
. 3. A very crucial datum about the nature of exis�rice was provided by G.E. 
Moore. You remember Moore's "Is Existence a Predicate?," Aristotelian. Society 
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Proceedinp Supplementary Volume, 15 (193l>), reprinted in his Philosophicaf 
� {London: George Allen & Unwin. Ltd·. ,  Ne-w Yoik: The Macmnran Company, 
1959).. l- WiD-refer t01the latter. Moore has a powerful passag� that reads as follows: 
The sentence 'Tame tigers growl' seems to me ambiguous. So far as 
I can see, it might mean 'All tame tigers growl>, or it might mean 
merely 'Some tame tigers growl', or 'Most tame tigers growl'. Each of 
these three sentences has a clear meaning, and the meaning of each is 
clearly different from that of either of the two othe� .... �ut I do not 
think that there is any ambiguity in 'Tame tigers exist' corresponding 
to that which I have pointed out in 'Tame tigers growr. So far as I 
CCl1 see 'Tame tigers exist' and 'Some tame-tigers exist' are merely two 
different ways of expressing exactly the same proposition . .. .It [ 'Tame 
tigers exist'J always means just 'Some tame tigers exist•, and nothing 
else· whatever. (p. 117; my italics.) . 
Then Moore goes on to claim that 'Some tame tigers do not exist'.is meaningless if 
'exist' is used in the same sense as in 'Tame tigers exist'. But I will not discuss this 
beyond pointing out that this reader has got the striking impression that Moore is 
there inclined to call a sentence meaningless, not because it is an unintelligible 
string of words, but because it cannot be true, or it cannot be false, that is, more 
accurately, because the proposition it expresses is necessary--and this comes to the 
view that the proposition ·expressed by 'Some tam e  tigers do not exist', which is 
exactly. the same as that expressed by 'Tame tigers do not exist', is necessarily true 
or nec�ssarily false. And this is an additional puzzle and datum. 
3.1 Our first datwn is Moore's first and primary point, namely, that 'Tigers exist' 
and 'Some tigers exist' express exactly the same proposition. This is a very shrewd 
observation .• It contrasts. neatly with the fact2 that the sentence 'Men are mortal', 
as used in normal life, expresses the same proposition as the sentence 'All men �e 
mortal'. This i&, in general, true of sentences of the form 'A's a.re B's' where being 
A necessitates being B. But clearly being a tiger (and, generally, for an empirical 
property being A, being A) does not necessitate being existing. Thus, in the empiri­
cal case *A's exist* is ·the same proposition as *Some A's exist* - using asterick 
quotes around a sentence to form the name of a proposition expressed by the 
sentence in question. . 
Now, Moore's observation invites the natural question, which is pregnant with 
suggestions: And what about the other tigers? We will have more to say about th.o.se 
other tigers later on. 
3.2 Our second datum is Moore's observed "meaninglessness" of 'Tigers 
do not exist'. As noted, this seems to be the necessity i.e., · the necessary truth or 
necessary falsehood of the proposition *Tigers do not exist* ·· and of its nega­
tion. But Moore did not see a possible ambiguity in the sentence 'Tigers do not 
emt', which ambiguity ooosism in two ways of under$tanding .the scope of the negation 
expressed by 'not' in that sentence. Given Moore's shrewd observation that *Tigers 
exist* ii the � proposition as *SooE tigers exa*, the sentence 'Some tigers do not 
exist' can have a negation in the scppe of the particular (not existential, nor yet in 
any case) quantifier expressed by 'some'. There are, then, two propositions that 
could be called negations of 
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namely: 
(2) It is not the case that some tigers exist 
and 
( 3) Some tigers do-not-exist. 
Hector-Neri· Castaneda 
That there are such propositions can be argued on the grounds of a principle of 
the closure of .negation, given that '(Some) tigers exist' expresses a proposition. At 
any rate, the question is: Which of the sentences after '(2)' and '(3Y is �'meaning­
less" in Moore's sense, i.e. which of the propositioris (2} and (3) is the one he inti­
mates. (or his discussion intimates) that is necessary? That is to say, which of the 
propositions (2) and (3) is our proposition *Tigers do· not exist* mentioned above. 
Obviously, the answer is: (3). Clearly) (2) is the contradictory of (1), and must be as 
contingent as (1). Then *Tigers do not exist* is th.e same proposition as *Some 
tigers do-not-exist*, whose contradictory is not (1), but 
( 4) It is not the case that some tigers do-not.exist, 
which is equivalent to: 
(5} All tigers exist. 
Both (3) and (5) �e "meaningless" in Moore's sense. Hence, one is necessarily true 
and the other is necessarily false. Since the point of the contingency of (ti is pre­
cisely the contingency of an instance of (5), it seems then that ( 5) is the necessarily 
false proposition. If it were necessarily true, then the truth of (1) woul� .foUow 
automatically by the standard instantiation of 'the universal quantifier in a non­
empty domain of discourse. Yet the truth of ·proposition (1) is an exciting truth 
that makes the world (the totality of real individuals) what it is. The non-emptiness 
of the universe of discourse is not an issue. The truth of (3) takes care of that. But 
there are more profound reasons for the non-emptiness of the universe of discou�e, 
as we shall see later on. · 
. A little reflection shows that (3) must be 'tr1:1e, once we allow 'for all thinkable 
tigers. Those tigers .with c9ntradictory properties are bound not to exist. 
· 3.3 Joseph Gilbert3 has commented on the Aristotelian principle about the 
square of opposition (SA): two corresponding sub·alternates cannot both be false 
- yet neither one is necessary. Thus at least one of "Some A is B" and "Some A is 
not B" is tr1Je. Gilbert observes that "Some existing A does not exist" is self-contra­
dictory. Hence by SA "Some existing A exists" is necessarily true, which is· para­
doxical. This is explained by the fact that in Aristotelian logic all terms (i.e., predi­
cates) are non-empty, so that in Aristotelian logic existence is not a term (or predi­
cate). On the other hand, if, more realistically, we allowed empty terms, then ·sA 
is false. Clearly, if there are no A's both "Some A�s are B's" and "Some A's are not 
B's" are. false, if we understand 'some' as 'there are'. Hence we can recognize that 
'Some existent A is non.:existing (or does not exist)' is self-contradictory even if 
'Some ex.isf'.ent A exists' is conti�ge�t. 
3.4. In conclusio� Mom:e�s existential data (a; I will s&y) suggests very powerfuliy. 
that the total domain of discourse we have at the back of our minds in our daily 
transactions includes both existing and non-existing tigers. Existence is, it seems, a 
property or a trait or a characteristic (choose your word) of only one subset of the 
entities we deal with in our daily experience. Furthermore, it is necessarily true 
that some tigers do- not exist, �d, QY similar considerations, it is necessanly true 
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that the universe of discourse of daily experiences have non-existing elephants, ptero­
saurs, etc. Since the proposition *Tigers exist* is not the same as the proposition 
*Most tigers exist*, there must be, then, either more non-existing tigeIS than exist· 
ing ones, or their amounts are the same. ,; 
4. My second set of data comes from Kant's well known P.tinciple that 
... the real contains no more than the merely possible. (Critique of Pure Rea­
son,A599/B627.) 
This is, of course, a mysterious principle. Kant did attempt to clarify it, and.in so 
doing he said so�ething very much worth pondering about: 
By whatever and by however many predicates I may think a thing 
--even if completely determined -- [ do not make the least addition 
' to the thing when I further declare that this thing exists. Oth�rwise, 
it would not be exactly the same thing that exists, but something 
more than what I have thought in the. concept,- and I could not say 
that the exact object of my concept exists. (A600/B628; my italics.) 
4.1 There are several important elements in Kant's discussion. The first one is 
about reality having exactly the same object that has been thought of. This theme has 
often been neglected, yet it is of crucial importar_ice, not only when it comes to 
whether reality agrees with our conceptions of it, but particularly when we 
engage in practical thinking. When we formulate plans and engage in carrying out 
our plans it .is of the utmost importance that we bring about,' or. help bring into 
existence, exactly what we had contemplated or h�d expected to bring about. Here 
is a datum that Kant did not consider, but we must take into account. Suppose that 
you are planning to make a .beautiful object, e.g., a painting, a book, a computer, or 
a chair. Characteristically, our plans include the contemplation, in an obvious 
sense, of incomplete (possible) objects. Regardless of how carefully you go into the 
details of the object you want to create, your actual creation will have many more 
properties than you were able to conceive. We may agree that this is simply a limit­
ation pertaining to our finite nature, and that infinite minds, like God's or the 
Arch-angel Gabriel's, do not face this predicament. The fact. is, however, that the 
ordinary and the extraordinary minds of this world are all finite. And we must live the 
tension between the neea for � int.o existence exactly the objects we plan t.o lring 
into existence, and our ontological inability to do so. Thi.s is at the very least the 
problem of accounting for the exactitude that our plans can attain, �d that prob­
lem is. within the field of problems pertaining to existence. 
4.2 Kant, however, was not interested in practical thinking wheQ.. he discussed 
the ontological argument. He had something more profound in view. He had in mind 
the crucial feature of existence of not being constitutive of an object ·· even if the 
object is completely determined. Hf: had in mind a contrast between the teal Q!.Qit 
,erties of an object which are somehow internal to the object, and existence, which 
is external to-the object: 
Whatever, therefore, and however much, our concept of an object 
may contain, we must go outside it, if .we are to ascribe existence to 
it. (A601/B629; my italics.) . 
This contrast between internal properties and extei:nal existence is something that 
Kant never clarified, but it is evidently clear that for Kant existence does not add 
anything to the content of an �bject, not because. it is an empty concept, and not 
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be�use it is a �ort of dependent P!operty, a conse9!-Je_ntial pro�erty. Consequential 
properties, _like being red, are il\ternal .to the object j�st !lS much as t�e properties 
on whi.ch they are consequences,_ �.g., the particµ�  shad� of i:ed in the latest issue 
of NOUS. Existence is not a property that supe;rvenes to an object by having a cer­
tain nature. E"istence is supervenient in tha� it accru�s to the whole object that 
exists, but as Kant tells us, it is something external to the object. This iD:t�rnal/ex­
ternal contrast has to do. with �hat we must think when we think an object and 
what the object gains by being part of reality. , .  
4.3 A third elerrent in Kant's discussion is what existence does to an object. As 
he says, while one hundred dollars in �he mind are exactly the same as one hundred 
dollars in my pocket, when what is in my mind is realized, the latter affect my fin­
ancial situation. in a way entirely beyond the scope of the former. So ei the� the 
former are not exactly the same as the latter, or the former have gained an impor­
tant property: that is, it seems as if the existence of a thing is really the only property 
of the thing that counts. It is something that has to be �dded to the m�rely possible 
100 dollars in �Y mind. Existence is the ultimate substance of the world. And this 
needs elucidating. 
4.4 Palpably, � of � points that Kant makes about existence is affected by 
the truth of propositions like *There is (exists) a prime number* and :"There exist 
properties under the genus coloredness*. These propositions do not involve e?'ist­
ence, as we characterize it above in Section 1. 
Kant's existential data includes, therefore: (1) the contrast between the fini-. 
tude of most. of the merely possible objects as they appear to the mind. and 
the infinitude of the real objects; (2) the puzzle about th.e existing being 
exactly the same as what has been t!nvisaged or expected; (3) the contrast between 
the internality of pr�dication of properties and the e.xtP.rn
.
ality of the possession 
of existence; (4) the absolute non-emptiness and nontriviality of existenc_e. 
It is clear, I hope, that Kant's discussion of the ontological argument is i.n· 
sightful, not because it furnishes a view of existence, hut �ecause it performs 
the proto-philosophical job of collecting philosophical data very well. I could 
extract other data. from his discussion, but I believe that the four data just 
listed are obviously profound and difficult and are crying out for a theory of 
both individuation an!) existence. 
5. The �rucial distinction between internal predication and exteq1al existence 
adumbrated by K�nt comes to play a large role in the dispute between Meinong and 
Russell. As you remember, Meinong's ontology includes not only p�ssible objects 
but impossible ones. One of his favorite examples was the round square. 
Meinong developed quite well Kant's merely-adumbrated finite or "incom­
plete objects. That is on� of Meinong's accomplishments. But he blurred this accom­
plishm�nt by identifying incomplete objects with universals. Thus, on his view every 
sphere contains the incomplete object the sphere. This is, as I hope to show in this 
paper, a catastrophic confusion -- as you may expect from any blurring of the dis· 
Unction between particulars and universals. 
5.1 Now, for Meinong the round square is round, and it is also square, 
which implies that it is not round, thought Russell. And this led. Russell 
held, to tl;le ,contradiction that tl)e ro1,md square is both round and not round. 
Here Meinong . co,'11d. but did not, reply that the proposition *The round 
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square is square* d.Oes not imply the proposition *The round square is not round* 
-and his faihlre to do so is ev�ce or· the underdevelopment of his iosights .. 
But a.side- from that· implication, Russell lGOk·up a simpler example: the case 
of the existing round square, Clearly, Meinong was committed to the truth or *The 
existing round square is existing*, and he said so. On the other hand, because of 
the incompatibility of roundness and squareness, MeinoHg was committed to the 
non-existence ot the round square, and he said that *The existing square does not 
exist* is true. And he held firmly to the view that: 
(11) The existing round square is existing 
and 
(12) The existing round square does not exist 
are not incompatible. As you undoubtedly remember, Russell claimed that he could 
not find any difference between (11) and (13) below: 
(13) The existing round square exists. 
Hence, Russell could not see the non-contradictoriness between (11) and (12). Thus 
lost Meinong his battle with Russell on the existing round square--or so our prede­
cessors have thought. It seems to me that Meinong was right in claiming that 
existence enters in two different ways in propositions (11) and (13). He 
actually went on to speak of a property of existence, which was an allusion to an 
internal predication--in perfect tine with Kant's conception of properties. 'The point, 
then, that Meinong had in mind, not too clearly, is this: Proposition (13) attrihutes­
externally existence to the existing round square, and is thus false; while (11) attri­
butes-internally existence to the same existing round square, and it is true--as any­
body can readily see. 
5.2 Meinong's reply to Russell is really only a dramatic way of emphasizing 
Kant's datum (3) in Section 4.4. In general, Meinong's impos.sible objects bring 
out, more forcefully than anything befort his discussion, the need for dis­
tinguis�ing between internal p_redication and external possession of existence 
or relations like identity. Consider the Meinongian incomplete object the 
thing that is llQt self-identical. Clearly there are the true propositions *The thing that 
is not self-identical is identical with itself* and *The thing that is not self-identical is a 
thing not self-identical*. These propositions are not each other's contradictory. 
Again, the problem is solved by viewing th� former as having external predication, 
and the latter as involving internal predication. This resolution of the puzzle has the 
additional consequence that identity and, equality are external relations--of 
the same general family as existence. This is why it is not at all surprising that 
Meinong could claim that all objects, whether existing or not, are self-identical, 
while Russell equated existence. with self-identity. 
6. The puzzle of negative existentials is too. well-known to rehearse here. It is 
clear that we want to analyze the proposition *Faffner did not exist* (to use Rich­
ard Cartwright's example) as about Faffner and as. having the same sense of 'exist' 
that appears in *Faffner existed* .4 .· 
7. Fictional entities create several problems. We have all felt at some time or 
other the urge to consider :fiction as a special mode of discourse, bracketed from 
reality, so that each word in a fiction piece can have the same meaning as it has out­
si<le fiction, yet the whole thing being deprived of existential ii:nport. But we all 
know that this bracketing is of very little value, ·even though t!here may be goad 
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re8'0ns for considering eacfl story as a description under a· unique story operator. 
The main· problem lies in that we live in a worut. that- has a masterful unity. Our 
fictional heroes are sometimes. identical �or so it very much seems) with our real 
heroes. Hence we must have quantifiers that range over both contexts about re� 
events and contexts about fictional events. We must understand the structu.re of 
our experience of the wortd in which that-unity of fiction and reality is a fact. This 
is a powerful piece of evidence tor the view that in Ure ordinary rich world of our 
daily experience we need possible objects, and existence is a propecy of them--just 
as Moore saw-but it must be an external property--just as Kant saw. 5 
8. There are many other types of data which suggest that existence is a prop­
erty, that existence is external, that existence is the substance of the world, that 
existence is not to be equated with identity., that our experience ·cannot be under· 
stood fully without fastening to such principles as these. But I will not gather more 
data. It is clear that we need a fundamental ontological account that makes the 
proper distinctions listed, and elucidates in particular the contrast between internal 
and external predication. Perhaps it may not be amiss to stress· that we ·need an 
account that considers all the data, including the ones "not discussed here. But any 
theory that takes into account less than the data discussed here is certainly inade­
quate. We should be wary by now of theorists who, under the vague idea of sim­
plicity, build on simple data. Our slogan is:: COMPLICATE; WHEN IN DOUBT, 
COMPLICATE! We want complex and complicated data ·• in order to construct 
simple, but comprehensive theories. 
Part II 
, 
The Ontology of Individual Guises: Informal Presentation 
1. Ontological atoms 
In good old Platonic style, l�t us take properties by themselves, i.e., 
separated from particulars, to be the ultimate components of the world. 
There is a verbal issue as to whether quantifiers are properties. To avoid it, let us 
say that the ultimate components of the world are Forms, and these divide into 
properties and operators. The former are ranked into -;;die, dyadic, triadic, .. ., 
in short,.!!·adic properties for any natural number .!!: 
Among the operators are those that operate on properties yielding complex 
properties. Some, like non-vacuous quantifiers, diminish theJl-adic rank of proper­
ties. Others, like logical connections, increase the rank of a property. Individuals 
are also operators that diminish a property's rank. (Formally, ihe most elementary 
mechanisms of property composition can be neatly described by systems of q-uan· 
tification that use operators. signs instead of variables as-, e.g., in Quine's "Variables 
Explained Away".) 
For convenience we shall use variables of quantification. Ontologically, we 
can regard the introduction of variables, let us call it variabilization, as the opera· 
tion that transforms abstract properties into propositional functions, which are the 
concrete properties entering in the composition of individuals. But this is not crucial. 
27 
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2. Individuals 
There is one operator, let ·us represent it by 'braces, that operates on entities 
and form sets. The primary sets are composed of concrete properties. Sets are 
abstract individuals. 
Another operator, let us represent it by ..£, operates on sets of Monadic 
properties (or propositional functions), whether simple or complex, and yields 
concrete individuals or individual guises. From now on 'individual' means 
concrete individual or individual guise. These are, roughly, Frege's senses of 
definite descriptions. For example, the round square is the individual _£ {being 
round and square}. The individual composed of the properties roundness and 
s<1uareness is � {being round, being square}. They are different because the sets of 
properties composing them are different: the former is a unit set, the latter is a pair. 
There is, of course, an intimate connection between them, and we discuss it in 
t6 below. 
Suppose that, as it seems likely, the round square � Meinong's favorite 
impossible object. That is to say, ·consider the individual£ tbe ing Meinong's favorite 
impossible object) . That is, obviously, quite a different individual from the.£. fbeing 
round and square) . Thus, the italicised occurence of the word 'was' in the first sen· 
tence of this paragraph does not· express genuine identity. We shall say more about 
identity below. 
3. Internal predication6 
An individual is in an obvious sense a cluster of properties. Most of them are 
finite clusters. Clearly whatever property Fness we consider, the Fer is F, and nec­
essarily so, if 'is' is meant in the sense of ontological composition. Thus, Meinong's 
persistent claim that "the Fer is F" is analytically, or logically, true, is correct in 
the primary sense of 'is'. Here I am using 'the Fer' as short for 'the individual which 
is only F', i.e., as 'c {qeing F}'. 
Let us call the primary predication internal predication, and let us repre· 
sent it by expressions of the form "a(F)", where 'a' denotes an individual and 'F' a 
property. Thus, the proposition expressed by a sentence of such a form is true, if 
and only if the property denoted by 'F' is a memt?er. of the set of properties 
constituting the· individual denoted by 'a'. 
Many of us have an inclination to think that Mount Everest neither possesses 
the property of being an even number nor possesses the property of not-being an 
even number, even t�ough the two properties seem to be mutually exclusive. This 
inclination is at bottom an intuition of the primary internal predication·.- Evi­
dently, for any property Fness we consider, many concrete individuals do not 
include in their constituting set the property Fness or its denial not-Fness. 
We also have an inclination to say -that for any property Fness anything has 
Fness or has not Fness. That inclination is the intuition that in our confrontation 
with the world we also use another conception of predication. We discuss it below 
in t5. 
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4. Identity 
Genuine identity is as it is normally conceived to be. It is a very special dyadic 
relation, which is reflexive and is governed by Leibniz's Law of the indiscernibility 
of identicals. In short, we have the following two fundamental ontological princi· 
pies: 
ld.l. x=x 
1d.2a. 
Entering in a fact is, of course, not a property. But identity requires the fact­
indiscernibility of identicals. Let 'q)� 1 '  express a fact, simple or complex, in which 
the individual denoted by 'a' enters and 'q>( a/b I '  the same fact with the individual 
denoted by 'b' entering in some positions in-that fact instead of the individual 
denoted. by '?· Th'en we have the law: 
ld.2b. (x=y) :::> (�[a] = q>(a/b] )  
5 .  Actualit;y 
Actuality, which accrues to concrete individuals, is most mysterious. It is the 
t:!timate act, in Aristotle's sense theft contrasts act with potentiality, and fies wholly 
::,;.;tside the realm of abstracts. (Note that as Plato observed, the realm of abstracts 
is so comfortable tO the mind that it lo·oks like its natural habitat .. ) Actuality must, 
of course, be at least obscurely and partially apprehensible. Otherwise, there would 
not even be a reference to a real world. Actuality has to. be thinkable, and this 
means that there is a Form, a sort of property, under which it is conceivable. This 
suggests another form of predication, connecting a concrete individual with other 
properties, which do not constitute it. Now, the previous characterization of an 
individual makes an individual bounded, determined exactly by a set of properties 
which may be finite and, hence, is not even closed under logical implication. Thus, 
actuality must not only connect an individual to other properties net in it, out 
must connect them in an external way. Furthermore, this external way has to pre­
serve the total individuality of each individual, na:mely, the individuality required 
by self-identity, i.e., by Leibniz's Law. 
All these vague considerations gain body in the view that among the 
properties there is a dyadic relation, which I call .£_,onsubstantiation or co-actuality. 
This is the only relation that connects aifferent concrete individuals., .and makes 
them both exist. 
Let us represent consubstantiation with the symbol 'C"''· (The,asterick comes 
after the letter 'C' to indicate that we are dealing with an a posteriori, or contingent, 
relation. The fact that there is only one asterick indicates that this is the funda­
mental, the number one, contingent relation; in a world deprived of thinkin:g it 
would be the only one.) Thus, i f  'a' denotes the morning star and 'b' the evening 
star, what is ordinarily meant by the sentence 'The morning star is th� evening star'. 
or by the sentence, 'The morning star is the same as the evening star', can bt> more 
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-perspicuously .put as the fact that 
C*(a,b). 
To··expl&in the nature of eonsubstan t1.ation··better let us ·analyze some .ordin­
ar.y statement51 Consider 
(11} The Principal is·-bald. 
· Most likely a person making a statement . .by means of sentence (ll) .would not in· 
tend to assert the .statement ef -internal . predication: 
. (11a} The :Principal (baldness). 
Most likely, such a person ..would t?e -meaning to.assert that the Principal exists and 
:has ·baldness, not as an ontologically constitutive property, but ·as a contingent 
-property. Thus his statement is more likely -this: 
{llb) Ttlere is an individual y such that: both C*(y, the Principal) and y 
(baldness). 
- - -
Consider now a relational proposition: 
(12) The Principfil kissed the Art Teacher. 
Once again, there ar� the internal, a priori trivial propositi-0ns, which are pal­
pably false: 
(12a) The Principal (k.issed-tbe-Art.Teacher-ness)'; 
(12b) The Art Teacher (being-kissed-by-the-Principal-ness.); 
(12c) {12a) & (12<:). 
But more likely whoever uses sentence (12) to make a statement in practical Ufe 
wants to convey some non-trivial information like this: 
(12d) There ls an individual guise y and there is an individual z such that: 
C* (y, the Principal) & C* (z, the Art Teacher) & y (kisSlng-the Art­
Teacher-ness) & � (being-kissed-by-the-Principal-ness):-
Consubstantiation is ah equivalence re1ation wit11in the actual. It conglomer­
ates infinities of individuals. Thus, the old Platonic idea that actuality is community 
receives here one of it,, clearest expressions. 
5.1. Existence 
On the present ontological view, existence is analyzed as self-consubstantia• 
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tion. Thus. we· can ·introduce the linguistic abbreviation.: 
Def. � exists a def. :c*(��). 
W.e. also· ·have the· law, or axiom: 
5.2.·-0onsubstantiation:""!E-qui:valence .preperties ; 
· Because consubstantiation is an eqllivalence .property within .the ·realm of 
.:existents, indeed, ·the most -important equivalence property from the point of view 
.of the .contingency of the w-0.rld, .the word 'is' expresses it. Thus, besides C* .1, ·we 
have the laws: 
C* .2. C*(�.}') ::> C*(!�) 
C* .3. (C*{��) & C�(�1�)) ::> C*�,� 
5.3. Consubstarit1a�ion: Actuality properties 
Consubstantiation is governed by the law of consistency, i.e., that only logic­
ally compatible sets of properties determine actualizable concrete individuals: 
, 
C*Aa. C*(��) :) (!(F) ::> - � (-Fn 
C*.4b. C*(��) ::> (!(-F) ::> -� (F)) 
In order to simplify the statement of the next laws of consubstantiation, let 
us introduce a simp1e convention: 
Convention. An expression of the form "a[q>] " is an abbreviation of an ex­
pression having the .operator 'c' prefixed tO an expression of the union of the 
set of properties making up the individual denoted by the sign a and the unit 
set whose member is the property denoted by the symbol <p. For example, if 
! is �{Round, Square], .!{Golden} is £{Round, Square, Golden). 
I shall refer to the individual denoted by an expression of the form "aI <p) ". as the 
q>-protraction of the individual denoted by !· 
-
'The communizing character of actuality is spelled out by the following laws: 
The Law of Contiguity: 
C* .5. C*(!,X) ::> (!_(F) ::> C*�>![ F])) 
The Law of Comp1eteness: 
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C* .6. C*(�.�) :::· (C*(x,x[F] )v C*(�1�[-F] )) 
The Law of Logical Closure: 
C*.7. C*(�1�) :::> (C*�1� [ F1] ) & ... & C*(�.�[Fn ] )  :>.C*(�1�[G ] ))· 
Provided that "(Fi & ... & Fn :::>G)" is a theorem in standard 
quantificational logic. 
The Law of Closure C*.7. is, of course, only the most general and fundamental law 
of closure there is. Laws of nature are specific laws of closure. The pattern of the 
law is the same throughout. All we need to change is the condition that a certain 
formula be a theorem in some system of laws of nature, instead of being a theorem 
in quantificational logic. 
5.4. Consubstantiation: Uniqueness 
One of the errors of Meinong was to confuse the incomplete object·The Circle 
with the property circularity. The latter is present in every existing circl�, but the 
former is not. The entity The Circle is c {Circle} , i.e., the individual which alone- is 
a circle. Hence if The Circle exists, there �sts only one co.nsubstantiation system 
in which circularity enters. Thus we have the law: 
C*.8. C*('£,�) :> (Y}:) (C*(�1X) & (VF) (�(F) ::> X(F)) ::> C*(�.}')) 
If x exists, then whatever exi<;tant has internally all the 
properties that � has internally is consubstantiated with !· 
5.5 Consubstantiation: Compossibility 
· Some relations require that if a nlatum exists so do the· others. If the Princi­
pal kisses the Art Teacher, the Art Teacher exists and is in reality kissed by the 
Principal. On the other hand, if the Principal looks for the art teacher of his dreams, 
the latter need not exist. Thus, for some relations -- . 
C* (�i•Yi{R¥1···.,li�?¥i+l•··:,�n1 ), for every !"'!,.'.. ,!!_. - - . 
6. Objectification or Consociation 
Concrete individuals are objects of thought, and as such, they are all on equal 
footing, whether .they are impossible, merely possible, or actual. or course·, some 
individuals are seldom thought of, and some will probably never be thought of. 
Those that are thought of enter in an empirical relatedness to a mind. And this rela­
tion requires analysis. The first thing to note about the objectification of an individ­
ual is that, as Meinong remarked, to think of an individual (an object in his termin­
ology) is to confer upon the individual some sort of existence, even if the object is 
non-existent, alas! even it it is impossible. Thus, objectification is like actuality, but 
it is not actuality. Hence, objectification must be analyzed as involving a special 
empirical, and therefore, external, dyadic relation between two concrete individuals, 
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as well, of course, as the fundamental internal predication. Let us represent 
this new empirical dyadic relation by the symbol 'C* ', where the letter 'C' signals 
again ti,e community of b�ing, th� double asterick signals the secondary character 
of the community in question,'anCi their postposition to 'C' signals the· a posteriori 
nature of th�t c'onimunity. Let u;·call th.is relation co-objectification ·or c�nsociation. 
Consider the sentence:· · · · 
(fa) Meinong used to think of the round square. 
· A partial c-ntological anatysis of what (13) expresses- is revealed l>y: 
(13a) There is an individual x such that: x (being thought of by. Meinong) 
& C** (!,�{!>eing round and square}). · · ' · .. 
· 
Naturally, (13a) does not analyze the way in which the individual Meinong enters 
into what ( 13) expresses. In the light of our di'scussion of actuality, presumably 
another part of (13) is:. 
(i3b) There is an individualisueh that<.Y (thinking of the round square) & 
C*(Y., �eiri(;mg).· · 1 • 
I submit that (13) is simply a� abbr�vi'ation. of 
(13c) There are individuals x and y such that: x (being thought of by Mein­
ong) & .Y.. (thinking of� {being r�u�d a!ld squar� } & ·9* (f, Meinong) 
& C** (�·.� {being rQund and squares)- · . . 
A fµfler und��tandirig o� "<de), <?r · (13}, requi�es .an �nderstanding � the · 
role of the proper na'me 'Meinong.' .. In section II'.13 we say something about the 
roles or' proper names. 7 · · · · · ., · · . · · 
Using a mixture of ordinary la.nguage arid the notation introduced· ab0ve i n .  
section 11.S..3, we can abbreviate (13c) as fotlows: 
(l3d) C* (Meinong, Meinong [thinking. of tfie round square J) & C** (the rountt square, the· r6und square [being Uiought -of by Meinong] ). 
ConsoCiation rs like ·consubstantiation, not .only: in being a dyadic external, 
genuine relation, but also in being an equivalence relation within its ·field. 
\ .  
Thus, ·we have the ·1awS": ·' • · ' :  
·c**.t. 
. C*.*.2. 
. q**.3. 
., C**(�·l') · 3 C**(�.�) 
C**(x,y) :, . C**(y ,x-) 
(C*'!'.fx�y) & · C*.*fy-:z)) ·=> . . C�(x,zf - - . .. .  1 - �.. - -o:  
• . :  
..
. 
� . • "' t. " . ; . , . . : . . . On the other hand, consoc1ation is not:consubstantiation'. .It lacks tire' eeatures of • • ... • • • • t ; • • � • • • • ••• eon.si$iency. closure, �ontiguity, and completeness.. 
· · 
.. . . .. . . ·; 
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7. Conflation 
Besides genuine :identity or selfsameness, characterized in section 11.4, th�i:e 
is another important a priori relation. lt is 1ike . identitY. in -Chat it deals with the 
-internal constituents of an indi.vidual. But it bas a· somewhat ext�rnai character, 
being .a genuine -me.:hanism of a pervasive and a priori .cemmunity of being. I call it 
cooflation, and · represent it ·by ttre symboi '*C'. It �s. like iaentity, an unrestricted 
eq11ivalenee relation: 
*C.1. *P{x,x) 
*C.2. *C(x,y} :::> *C°(1.1 ,x} 
*C.3. {*cf�-:¥) & *C('£�H :::> *G(�.�) . 
The law -of- internaU� that governs canflation is this: 
*C.4 . . *C(� ... ., F, .. ..G), �(.., F&G, _ .. j). 
Law *C.4 . .and *C.l. together justify tbe .tri»�al claim that the man w.ho murdered 
}?oth Napoleon and Ceasar :is the .same as-the entity that aione has the following 
properties: first _ is a man; second. murdered. N.apoteon; anC1 third,mutdered Caesar. 
The fol owing law m�y be calle.d the "self-is-entity propel.'ty of confla.Uon": 
*C.5. *C(�.�f-··}) 
wh'h:h Is *C(��[�""!'] ). a notatfo11 With .Yari'Bbles instea<i �f operators.: 
Law *C.5. establishes the conflation of each individual wUh the individual consti­
tuted by the .prepercy of beini identical with the former individual. Obviously, .the 
·two individuals. are different, since they have -diffetent properties
_ 
as constituents. 
Thelr community is, however, trivial and pro.found; that 'is, th�y conflate. 
-8. Ex�stence again 
!fhe �ecial case o.f law *C.6. in.volving the relation C* is worthy d special 
mention. It lies at the ce�ter of the pe-rennial.dlsputes about whether existence 1s a 
-{ll!dia* (i.e., a praperty) er not. In the present ontolQgical the9ry this issue receives 
a ''yes and no1' an�wei:.. 
On one han:d, existence is a property · in that it is thought -of through the 
-property Form *C. It .is .a compound property in that-it.is the special monadic case 
of C* opented on by. fb!flexivity: · 
· · 
On the other ·hand, existence is not.a pfoperty Jn that it is the contingency 
of -the world underlyin� the property C*, bu.t ly�ng otherwise fathomless beyond 
the jurisdiction -of the minci as the target of thought. Part of this fath-Omlessness -of 
existence .is -c8ptu-r� by Law. C* .6., o:f the completeness «>f oo-actu�lity. ¥et again, 
e-xistence m11st .be somewhat ·docile .and accesstble to a mind that is -not -ta stop 
chasing it tille.d with the ·despair of {aiture. This· par-tilt.docility .of existence is cap­
tured by the ..cot tier laws _of co-actuality' .ex.pecially the laws of -consistency and dos-
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ure. (Are these laws imposed by the mind itself to a somewhat complacent under­
lying reality?) 
· Existence i� mysterious. It is rieh and compfex as shown by its laws; ·it is 
wfiat in the end the whole of what thinking and acting is about. Yet it seems redun­
dant and empty. As Kant put it, "the real contains no �ore than the merely possi­
ble." More specifically, for any prope.i:ty Fness, the existing Fer is the same as the 
Fer. In the example that interested Meinong, the existing round square is the same 
as the round square. (I am not sure that Meinong clung fast enough to this sameness. 
in his dispute with Russett.) This sameness, i.e., the fundamental redundancy of the 
property of existence, is partially captured by the special laws: 
*C.6. *C(�.�C*(�,--·}} · 
*C.7. *C(�.�{being C* with �)). 
9. The Meinong-Russell debate on existence again. 
It may not be amiss to make -some comments on the Meinong-Russell dispute 
concerning the existing round square. It will be recalled that Meinong claimed both 
that the round square is round and that it is square. Russell argued that Meinong's 
principle that ·the Fer is F yields contradictions. Russell's first argument was that it 
is a contradiction to say that the round square is both round and square. His second 
argument was that, by that principle, the existing round squa.re, which we know not 
to exist, is existing; thus, we have' another contradiction. Meinong's replies were as 
follows: (1) the law of contradiction applies only to the real, not to the merely 
possible or the impossible ; (2) there is a difference between saying (a) the existing 
round square is existing, and (b) the existing round square- exists. 
On point (1) the present ontological theory sides with Russell on one issue: 
the law of contradiction must prevail thoughout the realm of truth. But it concedes 
a point to Meinong: it recognizes impossible objects. On point (2) Russell content· 
ed himself with saying that he did not see any difference between (a) and (b). How­
ever, the present ontological theory can formulate the difference and score a point 
for Mein'Ong. 
The sentence 
(14) The existin� round souare is existinl! 
can naturally be taken to express a proposition about internal predication, so 
that it must be analyzed as: 
{14a) The existing round square (being self-consubstantiated). 
Of course, sentence (14) can be interpreted also as expressing a different proposi­
tione, namely, the one naturally expressable by sentence (15) below. 
(15) The (existing) round square exists. 
Most likely (15) expresses a proposition about actuality, so that it must be parsed 
as 
(15a) C* (the (existing) round squaret the (existing) round square). 
We can drop the parenthetical word 'existing' in moving from (15) to (15a) by 
virtue of Law *C. 7. In any case, Meinong seems to be right in insisting on a distinc-
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tion between two natural interpretations of (14) and (15). If our exegesis of his 
claim is correct, namely, that he meant (14) as (14a) and (15) as (15a), then he is 
right in holding that what ('14) expresses is true while· 'what (15) expresses is false. 
Meinong did not proceed tc explain his claim about the difference between 
(14) and (15) as the difference ·between (14a) and (15a). He went on to speak of a 
modal aspect in the thinking of the proposition expressed witlh (15). But this is an 
obscure doctrine. · · · 
10.· Ordinary material objects and counting· 
On the ontological view being developed here, the concrete individuals our 
definite descriptions refer to are the same whether th�y exist or not: Our concrete 
individuals are material entities when they are actualized. Thus, the term 'the pres­
ent Queen of England' refers to the individual constituted by the property present­
Queen-of-England-ness, or the propositional function of being a present Queen of 
England. That term does not. refer, at ·1east not in its primary 
.
and basic meaning of 
use, to the individual the wife of the present Duke of Edinburgh. Nor does the term 
'the p.resent Queen of England' refer in its primary meaning or use, to the set of all 
those. concrete individuals. consubstantiated with the wife of the present Duke of 
Edinburgh. Of course, this set of individuals is consubstan.tiated with the set of 
indi'(iduals consubstantiated with the present Queen of England. But the term 'the 
present· Queen of England' does not ever.i refer, in its primary meaning or use, to 
this matter set. 
Yes there are occasions on which an utterance of the term 'the present Queen 
of England' may perhaps refer to the set of concrete individuals consubstantiated 
wi�h the present Queen of England. If it really exists, such use of the term is deriva­
tive and rests on its primary and basic u�e. Clearly, the use of the term � a·s short 
for an expressioh of the form 'm set of concrete individuals consubstantiated with 
r can be understood only on the aSsumption that the use of .1' in the unabbreviated 
description is both understandable and different from its abbreviated use. At any 
rate, when we count "the (present) Queen of England, the King of Denmark, the 
Emperor of Japa·n, the Duchess of Tuscany, the Dictator of Nicaragua, ... ," we 
seem to be counting the sets of individuals that we believe to be consu.bstantiated 
with the individuals being listed. 
It must be emphasized that the view we are expounding does no!. identify 
material obj,ects with the sets of mutually consubstantiated individuals. Sets are 
always abstract individuals. Thus quanti.fication ov�r our concrete individUJals is 
quantification over material objects, and quantification over sets of mutually con­
substantiated conc�ete individuals is not quantification over material objects. 
An ordinary concrete guise is at i.ts core an.aggregate of properties, or propo­
sitional functions. Indeed, we ·may say that an individual, material or otherwise, is 
a bundle of properties, including
. 
relational ones, to underscore the fact that it is 
not a mere aggregate or set of properties: the set has to be operated on by the con· 
cretizing operator c. Furthermore, an ordinary actual ·individual, material or not, is 
itself bundled up.Te., consubstantiated, with an infinity of other individuals. Our 
account of individuals is, hence, a sort of bundle-bundle theory. 
. '· -
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Tuus, .the present ontological theory si�es with the bundle-of-universals ptoo-
· rists, but it parts company with those theorists· who equate bundl�� with, sets. 
Apparently oµr theory also differs from.standard bundle theories in its -accot:1nt of 
bundlehood .. Our theory also differs from the theory� put forward by PtatQ in the 
Phaedo8., that an ordinary object is a set of particulars that exemplify just oo.e proper­
ty. It also differs from the view often attributed. to Stout, that an· ordinary object 
is an agglomeration of particularized properties. (I often miss the distinction be­
tween a particularized property and a simple or perfect particular that exempli-fies 
just one property.) 
11. Leibnizian and quasi-Leibnizian individuals 
From the laws of contiguity and consistency governing consubstantiation it 
follows that each individual, say the Fer, that exists determines a set of sequences 
of mutually consubstantiated individuals that culminate in one infinite individual, 
i.e., one individual that is constituted by a maximal consistent set of properties. 
Such infinite individuals I call Leibnizian concrete individuals. Naturally, they are 
beyond the apprehension of finite minds. To apprehend a Leibnizian individual one 
must be able to contemplate the set of properties in p:opria persona, with all its 
members in full view. As Leibniz noted, such individuals (which he called complete 
concepts, for reasons beyond our present compass) are fitting objects for a divine 
understanding. 
Also as Leibniz noted, as each Leibnizian individual contains in its cons­
tituti11g set of properties all its, relations to all other individuals, each Leibnizian 
individual contains in its inside the whole history of a possible world. Any two 
Leibnizian individuaJs mirror each other. A Leibnizian individual can belong to just 
one possible world. 
Leibnizian individuals are wholly beyond our reach. Well, yes, they are be­
yond our direct reach. But they are indirectly accessible: they are pointable. Since 
sets .of properties constitute the core of concrete individuals, there are g1Jasi-Leib­
nizian individuals available to us. These are the indivi�uals whose core is a property 
of the Corm having all the properties of a certain Leibnizian individual. Such quasi­
Leibnizian individuals must perforce exist and be consubstantiated with actual Leib­
nizian individuals. For instance, consider the individual the present Queen of Engl­
and. It is consubstantiated with the married present. Queen of England, with the 
present Queen of England that is married and has a living husband and begat child­
ren who are living such that one of them is consubstantiated with (if you wish, is 
the same as) the J.>rince of Wales, and .... The sequence ends with a Leibnizian 
individual. I cannot present it here or anywhere else. But the quasi-LeibnizianJ:{be­
ing -the Leibni:r.ian culmination of the sequence of mutually consubstantiated indiv­
iduals that begins with the present Queen of England} is consubstantiated with the 
Leibnizian individual at the end of that very sequence of individuals. 
QulJ.Si-Leibnizian individuals are rather cheap and obscure. But they are our 
only links with Leibnizian individuals. They provide us with guidance in our for­
midable task of lengthening our acquaintance with chains of mutually co11substan­
tiated finite individuals. 
We said above that when we engaged in so-called counting material objects 
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we seen:i to be counting sets of mutually consubstantiated Individuals. Of course, 
we are. Bttt we are .also counting Leibnizian, as well as quasi·Leibniziao individuals. 
Thus when we count "t}_le Queen of Engfand, the King of Nairobi, the President of 
Veneiuel1l, the Dictator of Portugal, ... " we may take each of these definite descrip· 
tions as being used in a special sense as abbreviations for descriptions referring to 
quasi-Leibnizian indMduals. This is perfectly fine. What is crucial to keep in mind 
is that the-abbreviationaf uses, again, must be derivative and presuppose the primary 
use of referring to an individual having just the property being mentioned. 
Many Leibnizian individuals are material individuals. Thus, if we allow that 
there is an absolute space and time at which consubstantiated individuals consub­
stantiate, we might think that our ontology contradicts the principle of the impene­
trability of matter. There is, of course, no such contradiction. This principle has to 
be analyzed in terms of �ndividuals. What it says is that one region R of space can­
not be occupied at a given timeJ. by material individuals that are not mutually con­
substantiated. But a Leibnizian individual, the finite individuals c:onsubstantiated 
with it, and the quasi-Leibnizian individuals consubstantiated with them both, can, 
and must, occupy the same region of spacetime. 
Existing concrete individuals belong into semi-lattices of consubstantiation, 
at the apex of which semi·lattices lie Leibnizian in.dividuals. 
Part III 
Conclusion 
I have discussed the Meinong-Russell debate, thus showing how the ontologi­
cal system developed in Part II elucidates the existential data we encountered in 
Meinong's discussions. We would examine the other data recorded in Part I and see 
how they ar,e elucidated in the systems of Part II, which is built on the idea that 
properties are internal to objects �d existence is an external relation among some 
of them. It is clear also how one can bring into existence precisely the objects one 
has planned rto create. Whatever additional relations they have must be external to 
the objects resulting from their existing. But we shall not continue this necessary 
exercise. It is left for the reader's en.ioyment, since nothing can be more satisfying 
to the mind than seeing how the proto-philosophical data are elucidated by and fits 
with one another within a philosophical theory, 
It is important that, as we note� at the very end of Part I, our philosophical 
theories be fruitful and not merely ad-hoc for some narrow data. And this is a most 
crucial test that the theory outlined in Part II must meet. However, there is no time 
here to go into a full examination of other philosophical problems that find a solu­
tion within the Abstractist theory of Part II. I will just mention that that theory 
provides the basis for a theory of proper names and descriptions, is a satisfactory 
theory for the problems of referential opacity and quantification into psychological 
contexts, and lends itself to a theory of knowing-who that distinguishes between 
knowing-who and quantifying into knowledge contexts. The theory of Part II with 
its contrast between consubstantiation and consociation provides the basis for the 
theory of the ontological foundations of literature. The contrast between identity, 
on one hand, and the other external relations, consubstantiation and consociation, 
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.O!l the other, prov.ides .a solutfon to -the rnany problems .that have .been encountered 
in the treatment of contingent identity and the special ones involved fo so-called 
t·ca1 "d ... t 9 tnt!<'re : 1 .en.,1 .y. 
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61n "Thinking and the Structure of the World," I called internal predication 
�elnongian. This· seems to be a "historical error. Meinong distinguished two prope_r· 
ties· (predicates) of existence, rather than two predications· ef ·ohe and the self-same 
property or predicate. For a more compreh<msive account of the different types of' 
predication see the Appendix to "Philosophical Method and the Theory of Predica­
tion and Identity,'' NOUS 12 (1978): 189-210 
7For my view ot proper names see my "On the Philosophical Foundations of 
Communication: Reference," Howard K. Wettstein's "Proper Names and Proposi­
tional Opacity," and my "The Causal and Epistemic Roles of Proper Names in Our 
Thinking of Particulars" ·- all- in P. French, T. Uehling, and H. Wettstein, eds., Con­
temporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1979). 
8For Plato's view of. individuals see my la teori� de Platon sobre las Formas, 
!as relaciones y los particulares en el Fedon (Mexico: Universidad N_acional Auto­
rioma de Mexico, Cuaderno 34, 1976), or "Leibniz and Plato's Phaedo Theory of 
Relations and Predication," forthcoming in a volume on Leibniz edited by M. 
Hooker to !be published by the University of Minnesota Press. 
, 
9For a fuller treatment of identity � my "Identity and Sameness," 
Philosophia, 5 (1975). 
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